




There are twenty politically independent island microstates in the devel-
oping world-that is, states with populations of less than a million (Table
I). Though various definitions of Third World microstates are possible
(that might also include Mauritius, Nauru, or Singapore) none are as con-
venient as this crude generalization. In this paper I examine development
trends in these states, reflect on the meaning of independence, and com-
pare and contrast the experience of these states with dependent and often
neighboring territories and colonies. In particular I focus on the extent to
which the structure of economic change is conducive to long-term devel-
opment, and seek to compare the experiences of Pacific states with those
of other island microstates. These experiences are often shared by larger
countries (such as Jamaica or Papua New Guinea) and by landlocked
states, either in Africa (eg, Lesotho) or Asia (eg, Bhutan) or even in
Europe (eg, Andorra and Liechtenstein): "it is not always easy to disentan-
gle the effects of smallness from those of remoteness and peripheralness-
or from those of newness. It may not in the end be specially profitable to
try to do so" (Davies 1985, 248; cf, Connell 1988a). I shall not do so here.
Islands are not so unusual, but small island states are quite different from
larger states, in the structure and context of their economic development.
Definitions of development have been legion, mainly revolving around
issues such as basic needs, equity, self-reliance, and power. More than
twenty years ago the economist Dudley Seers suggested, "The questions to
ask about a country's development are: What has been happening to pov-
erty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been hap-
pening to inequality?" (1969, 3). This perspective subsequently expanded
into the concept of "redistribution with growth" (Chenery et al 1974),
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Table I. Island Microstates, 1988
Population
density GNP per
Population Area (persons capita Life
(thousands) (sq km) per sq km) us$ expectancy
CARIBBEAN
Antigua and
Barbuda 78 442 176 3,690 73
Bahamas 244 13,940 18 10,700 68
Barbados 254 430 590 6,010 75
Dominica 82 750 109 1,680 74
Grenada 94 345 272 1,720 69
St Kitts-Nevis 42 269 156 2,630 69
St Lucia 145 616 235 1,540 71
St Vincent and
the Grenadines 120 388 288 1,200 70
INDIAN OCEAN
Comoros 442 1,865 236 440 56
Maldives 202 298 678 410 60
Seychelles 68 404 168 2,800 70
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Cape Verde 360 4,033 89 680 65
Sao Tome and
Principe 119 826 144 490 65
SOUTH PACIFIC
Fiji 732 18,272 40 1,520 71
Kiribati 67 690 97 650 55
Solomon Islands 303 28,530 11 630 64
Tonga 97 700 139 830 66
Tuvalu':' 9 26 346 570t 68
Western Samoa 159 2,935 54 640 66
Vanuatu 147 11,880 12 840 64
Source: World Bank, 1990, 243.
Note: Because none of these data can be considered wholly accurate, the table is
included solely for comparative purposes.
':-Data for Tuvalu are from Pacific Economic Bulletin 1990, 5 (I): 36.
t1980.
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Seers expanded his perspective to embrace "greater independence with
redistribution and growth" (1977, 5), and much debate surrounded the
definition and use of various concepts of basic needs (Connell 1980, 64-
71). Few concluded that development was anything other than complex,
multifaceted, and relative. Wallman stated development to be "a progres-
sion towards the (better?) meeting of basic needs, and ... a progression
towards (greater?) autonomy and authenticity of self and/or nationhood"
(1977, 12). This paper is situated in the context of these diffuse perspec-
tives on development.
Most island microstates became independent in the 1960s and 1970s, an
era of extraordinary optimism over the prospects for development in the
emerging states of the Third World. Even so, not all tiny states sought
independence willingly; some preferred federation with neighboring
states, others had independence largely thrust upon them (eg, Kiribati,
Solomon Islands), and many small islands (notably Anguilla) struggled
successfully against any prospect of independence. Few (like Vanuatu)
were forced to fight for independence. The movement toward indepen-
dence for island microstates coincided with the efflorescence of develop-
ment studies; in the 1970S there was an explosion of institutes, journals,
courses-and, of course, consultants and their range of advice. Newly
emerging states (like Papua New Guinea) were offered "a model of devel-
opment to avoid" (Hart 1974)-based on the disappointing experiences of
sub-Saharan African states-on the assumption that the principle gain
from "late-development," or at least late independence, was that the suc-
cesses and failures of previously independent states would provide power-
fullessons. One way or another, development strategies sought to build
on what had gone before.
The development plans and policies of the newly independent states
were oriented to the classical task of maximizing local resources, though
these were recognized to be often extremely limited. They focused on the
export of agricultural and fisheries products (and minerals in the rare
cases where they existed), assumed that industrialization would eventually
follow and that it would initially be oriented to import-substitution and
the processing of agricultural goods, along the lines of Michael Lipton's
dictum "if you wish for industrialisation, prepare to develop agriculture"
(Lipton 1977, 24). In this scenario, the role of tourism was ambivalent; in
the Caribbean it was already well-established, but in the Pacific it was less
welcome because of its feared cultural implications and seen, in every
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way, as something of a "last resort" (Lea 1980). Development strategies
were evolutionary rather than revolutionary, stressing the necessity for a
greater degree of self-reliance, which would inevitably follow the empha-
sis on agriculture (especially subsistence agriculture) and fisheries. Even
the most dependent territories, such as the Northern Marianas, sought
greater self-reliance-by which time the basic philosophy had become lit-
tle-more than a rhetorical incantation. Eventually, it was recognized, as
the former president of Palau observed, that "we have to educate the peo-
ple to the need for sacrifice. So we will have to use dependency to achieve
self-sufficiency" (quoted in Connell 1988a, 16). Aid was widely expected
to play some role in the structural transformations required to achieve
greater self-reliance.
Clearly it was not going to be easy for island states to achieve either
greater self-reliance, or, in any conventional sense, the transition to devel-
oped country status. Such concerns had often delayed independence,
because both colonial administrators and dependent populations feared
that small size might be a constraint on development. However, size was
never a criterion for statehood; the traditional criteria were the need for a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capac-
ity to enter into international relations with other states. A litany of now-
familiar problems emphasized the difficulties of development: remoteness
and isolation (hence high transport costs to remote markets), disecono-
mies of scale, limited natural resources, substantial trade deficits (but con-
siderable dependence on trade with metropolitan states), few local skills,
vulnerability to hazard, disproportionately high expenditure on adminis-
tration, political fragmentation, and a dependence on external institutions
for some key services (eg, universities and banks). Political systems were
fragile, ecological structures were vulnerable, and economies lacked diver-
sity. Set against these disadvantages were few obvious advantages: isola-
tion had led to some degree of cultural preservation (but language groups
were often so small that their integrity was often disrupted by a modern
world of education and mass media); at the same time, isolation had led to
many remote islands having strategic value (a situation that often enabled
financial gain, but not without considerable social cost, as the situations
of Bikini and Ebeye in the Marshall Islands, or Diego Garcia, have well
illustrated). On balance the constraints on development appeared to over-
whelm the advantages, a situation that was dismissed in the immediate
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postcolonial era as a first generation of leaders undertook to transform
new nations. The stage was set.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
Without exception island microstates were characterized by their agricul-
tural economies, a situation that usually continued well into the second
half of the twentieth century. Outside the Pacific, plantation economies
historically dominated the agricultural sector, but in the twentieth century
the plantation system, and the "coconut overlay," reached the Pacific
Islands, freezing land areas, and ushering in a world of monetization and
commodity consumption. The inheritance of plantation systems has often
proved a burden rather than a blessing; land reform has become a con-
stant theme of agricultural development, especially in the context of (usu-
ally) rising population numbers; and virtually nowhere does agriculture
still characterize the economies of island microstates, except in terms of
employment (though not in the formal sector).
A small number of island microstates-notably the three Atlantic states
of Cape Verde, Sao Tome, and Principe and the Indian Ocean state of
Comoros-have experienced agricultural problems that have brought
them close to famine. Their situations, and to a lesser extent those of such
atoll states as the Maldives and Kiribati, are of continuing concern. There
and elsewhere a number of general trends have influenced the direction of
agricultural development. First, attitudes toward agriculture and agricul-
tural employment have changed substantially; in parallel with the in-
creased need to earn cash, agricultural work throughout the island
microstates has lost prestige, and the declining participation of young men
especially is ubiquitous. Changing aspirations are not solely the province
of young men; in Tonga "one often hears parents expressing the wish that
their children 'work at something better than agriculture' even though
they themselves are farmers. This 'something better' invariably refers to
white-collar jobs which carry with them a lot of prestige" (Fred Sevele,
quoted by Bedford 1980, 49). In Fiji youths "are taught to value white-
collar occupations and farming" (Naidu i981, 8). Such attitudes, along-
side the expansion of urban employment opportunities (at home or
abroad) have led to migration (and emigration), increasing the depen-
dency ratio in many rural areas, leading to an aging and often more female
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population, imposing heavy burdens on those who remain, and often
leading to declining agricultural production both in total and per capita.
Migration has led to a general decline in the use of marginal and distant
land, a process that has gone on for several decades in many island
microstates, and left several Caribbean islands (even such small ones as
Antigua) with as much as a third of potential agricultural land lying idle.
Changing attitudes to -agricultural employment parallel changing atti-
tudes to food consumption. Changing tastes, monetization, prestige, and
the cost and availability of imported foods have led to a rapid movement
toward "food dependency," a situation where food and beverage imports
are disproportionately high. In half the island microstates more than a
third of all imports by value are foods and drinks, leading to a greater
incorporation in the world trading system, in which the terms of trade
rarely favor island commodity producers. The simultaneous decline in
subsistence agricultural production and growth of imported food con-
sumption (especially tinned meat and fish, rice, biscuits, and flour) have
reduced the regularity and variety of food consumption (because cash
flows are variable) and substantially increased the incidence of diet-related
diseases such as diabetes. There has been a disintensification of traditional
agricultural systems (and a switch to low intensive crops such as cassava,
with negative nutritional consequences); a loss of variety (in gardens and
through hunting, gathering and fishing); and the resultant loss of what has
been termed in Fiji the "subsistence safety net" (Taylor 1987).
Agricultural economies, even in historical plantation states, have usu-
ally become increasingly specialized, favoring a small number of export
crops such as sugar, and these crops have generally benefited from the
concentration of public expenditure (research funds, loans, provision of
infrastructure, etc) in these export-oriented areas. By contrast public
expenditure on food crops is notoriously lacking. Although at particular
times island microstates have achieved niches in the world market econ-
omy for such minority crops as ylang-ylang (Comoros), ginger (Fiji), and
vanilla (Tonga), only exceptionally have these proved to be long-lasting
and capable of supporting more than a minority of farmers. More gener-
ally, even relatively large states such as Mauritius are highly dependent on
a single export crop; monoculture has led to intermittent "Caribbean
sugar crises," a severe recession in Sao Tome (when cocoa prices fell), and
declining production (and export) at times of falling prices. Diversifica-
tion has rarely ensued. In exceptional circumstances, however, some
CONNELL. ISLAND MICROSTATES 257
island microstates have filled a new niche with one particularly successful
product-marijuana. Even in the large island state of Jamaica it is the sin-
gle most important export by value (though no statistics record this fact);
in Palau it is also the most valuable export. In St Vincent it has not only
brought new wealth into the community but "it is fostering a reduction in
the stigma attached to working land amongst young people, and this may
be its most important legacy" (Rubenstein I988, I30). It is, of course, uni-
versally illegal and poses certain obvious problems.
Several disadvantages are associated with the concentration on and
export of a small range of crops from island microstates, including ecolog-
ical problems, the similarity with other island microstates (and with much
larger tropical countries, where there are economies of scale and better
market access), and the vulnerability to fluctuations in world market
prices. Crucial to success has been the ability of many island microstates
to negotiate bilateral agreements that give special advantages and avoid
competing at global price levels; such exclusion from free market condi-
tions has further emphasized the concentration on export crops. This has
been particularly true for sugar producers, with preferential access to both
the European Economic Community (EEC), through the Lome Conven-
tion, and the United States. For example, Fiji sells three quarters of its
sugar under favorably priced contracts, giving it "a degree of price stabil-
ity and security and ... in recent years, prices above the world market
average" (Fairbairn I985, 99). Where special agreements have been
reached, as in the Caribbean, "the misery of growing cane is nothing com-
pared to the misery of growing other crops" (World Bank I987, 3). Away
from particularly favored commodities such as sugar, the prospects are
more limited; copra producers, for example, have few advantages. In a
sense, "this process of subsidy amounts to a type of annually renewable
aid package. But this is no ordinary aid package. Instead it is an aid pack-
age operated and administered by the full machinery of a national econ-
omy. This is aid with dignity" (Taylor I987, 3). Fiji, like other island
microstates, has no genuine comparative advantage in sugar production
(as some assumptions about efficiency suggest) but, in fact has "a compar-
ative advantage in the garnering of subsidies and long-term and short-
term contracts for whatever it produces" (Taylor I987, IO). Protected mar-
kets and subsidized prices have been crucial to agricultural development in
island microstates. On balance, the high and stable prices paid for the
crops that are currently grown appear to have overcome anxieties about
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longer term agricultural diversification. Moreover, there is some probabil-
ity that preferential access for most island microstates will continue, as
has been well described for Fiji:
In a free-market world the comparative advantage of Fiji's farmers would sus-
tain its principal exports, but at highly volatile returns owing to the sensitivity
of world markets. The future would be one of constant stress, demanding all
sorts of protective ioternal transfer measures to keep agricultural industries
and the whole economy afloat. However, Fiji is also part of another world in
which economic considerations do not have first place. The Lome Agreement,
under which European over-suppliers support some of the production of their
formerly colonial over-suppliers, is a striking illustration of behaviour in this
world. Fiji's membership in the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific group assures it of
the benefits which come from a conviction that it is politically necessary to
keep the economies of these countries buoyant to avoid their descent into pov-
erty, revolution and a shift in their allegiances. The survival of Fiji as a rela-
tively prosperous, relatively stable cornerstone in a strategically delicate South
Pacific is of importance to all the larger circum-Pacific countries, and to coun-
tries as far away as Europe. If Fiji needs to sell its exports in order to retain at
least some development momentum, this strategic factor will ensure that those
exports will be sold. Present trends in the geopolitics of the Pacific are Fiji's
strongest guarantee of future export performance. (Brookfield 1987, 56-57)
For the moment those island microstates that are able to produce appro-
priate agricultural commodities and gain access to preferential prices can
assume that these prices will not decline dramatically.
Where crops that attract preferences cannot easily be grown, the situa-
tion is quite different. Symptomatic of the problems of agricultural devel-
opment in the more remote island microstates, especially in the Pacific,
one review of agricultural exports in the region concluded that, "despite
the fact that real prices remain near historic lows, improvements in the
production, transport and marketing of coconut and coconut products
probably offer the best short-run prospect for general improvement in
trade balances in the region and the best short run means for improving
the economic well-being of the region's families." Ultimately, though
"long-run prospects for the export of coconut products offer little hope
that they might provide a basis for financing major new capital develop-
ment in the region" (Charle 1986, 26). Outer islands, and the atoll states,
will be unlikely to share in the benefits of protected prices, which cur-
rently do not sustain copra prices at high levels, despite EEC support for
copra-marketing boards.
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The disadvantages and limited prospects of agricultural development
beyond "protected" crops have convinced many observers that a contin-
ued focus on increased agricultural production in national development
strategies for island microstates may be unwise. A review of South Pacific
trade concluded that "the expansion of manufacturing capacity should be
encouraged to offset diminishing returns to land. In this effort the guide
should probably be the successful experience of East Asian countries
which had adopted outward-looking, export-oriented industrialisation
rather than import-substitution industrialisation" (Charle 1986, 30). How
this might be achieved was unstated and, so far, industrialization of any
kind, especially in the Pacific Islands, has been limited in its achievements.
Broadly, the same kind of cumulative downward spiral that has affected
agriculture has also affected artisanal fisheries in island microstates,
though less dramatically and less well documented. Considering the great
extent of the fishing grounds that surround the island microstates, and the
often-limited role of agriculture, artisanal fishing is an extremely underde-
veloped economic activity. Several common problems have contributed to
this: a lack of biomass (especially in atoll states), overexploitation, and
the costly and uneconomic purchase of boats, gear, and fuel. Fishers are
too often viewed, much like farmers, as unworthy of serious government
investment of energy and resources. For example, in Mauritius there is
reported to be an "island-wide mentality to view traditional fishermen
with undignified contempt and to blame their distress and misery on insuf-
ficient volition and salubrity" (Paul 1987, 144). Marketing infrastructure
for an extremely perishable product is often inadequate and, as in the
Caribbean, "the policy of most governments has appeared to be in token
form" (Walters 1984, 95), even behind that for agriculture. Successes have
been few and far between.
Exploitation of the fisheries potential of the vast areas within the two-
hundred-mile exclusive economic zones of island microstates is an even
more challenging prospect. Current development potential is primarily
restricted to the leasing of these areas to the deep-water fishing vessels of
distant, richer nations. International restructuring, incorporating more
capital-intensive purse-seiners demanding sophisticated technical skills, at
a time of global market saturation, as well as the lack of onshore facilities,
have restricted the attempts of island microstates to participate in this sec-
tor. Depressed market prices throughout the 1980s have also created prob-
lems for all countries with significant fisheries sectors. Moreover the EEC
STABEX scheme, which provides concessionary finance for most agricul-
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tural exports, does not apply to exports of fish. This is obviously signifi-
cant for several island microstates, including Cape Verde, where fish con-
stitute 42 percent of all export earnings; STABEx covers only 8 percent of
all Cape Verde's exports. Island microstates have been primarily depen-
dent on free market prices for fisheries development, and this dependence
may constitute a further reason for the limited development of their
national fisheries.
Only three island microstates, Fiji, Mauritius, and the Solomon
Islands, have developed fisheries to the extent that they now operate
nationally owned or joint-venture canning factories. Island microstates
have yet to gain significantly from the 1982 exclusive economic zone legis-
lation; moreover the countries of the eastern Caribbean have acquired
exclusive rights "to some of the most biologically unproductive waters in
the region" (Dolman 1985, 58). In the Indian and Pacific oceans the poten-
tial is greater, yet ocean space gains, because of nonexistent technical
capacity to exploit them, are more theoretical than real, and even policing
these waters is extremely difficult. The importance of Pacific Island
microstates has been apparent in their almost total inability to restrict ille-
gal fishing; for the foreseeable future the likelihood of their developing
internationally competitive national fishing industries is very poor. How-
ever, it is one of the few realistic economic development prospects for this
group and perhaps for some of their counterparts in the central Indian
Ocean.
The fishing industry remains primarily based outside the island micro-
states. Although small fleets are now based in several Pacific states
(including Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Tuvalu), and have been
established through bilateral aid programs, capital ownership remains
almost entirely in external hands, catches are small relative to those of
overseas fleets, and the contribution to employment has been limited.
Some of the world's largest transnational corporations are involved in
tuna fishing and processing in the Pacific region, and some island micro-
states have had their tuna development plans disrupted by overseas activi-
ties. Few countries have control of the tuna resource or the capital to con-
struct their own processing facilities; where they do, benefits other than
licensing fees are virtually nonexistent since there is no local processing
and no use of local workers for fishing or other activities.
Most processing is undertaken in rich countries, or in territories such as
American Samoa. Fish prices are as flexible as cash crop prices. The col-
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lapse of export prices, and the withdrawal of Japanese fishing companies
in 1982-1983, led to the collapse of the promising Maldives fishing indus-
try (Sathiendrakumar and Tisdell 1986, 281). In the Pacific a similar col-
lapse enabled island microstates, through the South Pacific Forum Fish-
eries Agency, to eventually regulate the depredatory fishing activities of
vessels of the American Tunaboat Association and achieve improved
access fees. However, this change followed both a decline in the value of
fish imports into the United States and an upward revision by the United
States of the strategic importance of Pacific Island microstates, partly as a
consequence of the leasing of fishing rights by Kiribati and Vanuatu to the
Soviet Union. The signing of the Multilateral Fisheries Access Treaty in
1987, between the several members of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries
Agency and the United States, was a significant development that guaran-
teed an income of US$12 million per year over a five-year period. Most
countries have entered into some form of agreement with metropolitan
states, or with the EEC, for the leasing of national waters. However,
because island microstates, even with enlarged exclusive economic zones
where stocks are largely unknown, are seeking to enter a depressed and
highly protected market in competition with metropolitan producers,
even licensing fees have failed to live up to expectations. Nevertheless,
those island microstates that do gain significant income from fisheries, do
it primarily through leasing their waters rather than through owning fish-
ing fleets. However, such countries receive less than 5 percent of the value
of catches in their waters in licence fees (Fairbairn 1985, 82). Though such
returns are small, they constitute a major source of revenue for some
island microstates.
Few small island nations are minerals producers. Fiji is, however, a sig-
nificant gold producer and has gained from the gold-price rises of the
1980s. Nearby Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, astride the Pacific "rim of
fire," are also poised to establish mining industries, though by their nature
such industries are foreign-owned, generate little employment, may con-
tribute to a "Dutch disease," and pose some ecological problems. The con-
temporary violence of the nearby Bougainville gold and copper mine,
where militancy over compensation for environmental problems escalated
into a secession movement, and the social problems experienced in Nauru
have emphasized the disadvantages of mining, but it does offer possibili-
ties in a small number of places where there are proven resources. There
are also prospects for the marine mining industry, none of which appear
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imminent, and energy-in growing quantities-must invariably be im-
ported.
The development of the natural resources (to which the timber industry
might be added) of island microstates has become increasingly tied to the
world political and economic system. Subsistence activities, whether in
agriculture or fishing, have steadily given way to commodity production.
Despite official emphasis on diversity, monoculture has thrived, and pro-
ductive activities that are rural, labor-intensive, involve female participa-
tion, and incorporate appropriate (nonimported) technology have been
replaced by their converse. Despite subsidized agriculture and the rental of
coastal waters, national incomes derived solely from natural resources
have been disappointing and have ensured that island microstates have
sought to diversify beyond their supposed comparative advantage-the
agricultural and fisheries economy-into other arenas.
INDUSTRY, TOURISM, AND BEYOND
Two sectors-manufacturing industry and tourism-are quite conven-
tional and, in the case of tourism, were well established in some states
prior to independence. Classical industrialization, the establishment of
import-substitution industries, has proved difficult because of standard
constraints such as the small size, fragmentation, and low earnings of the
domestic market; limited skills; few raw materials; inadequate access to
technology and investment capital; high energy costs; and the lack of tariff
protection for new industries. Most such industries are agro-food indus-
tries (bakeries, breweries, etc) characterized, in the eastern Caribbean, as
the "Coke, Curtains, Coconut Cream and Corn Curls" phase of industrial
development (G. Theophilus, quoted in Connell 1988a, 53).
Historically, the establishment of export-oriented industries proved
even more difficult. Extra problems, in addition to most of the problems
that faced import-substitution industries, included access to markets (in
terms of both infrastructure and tariffs), small volumes of goods, and high
labor costs. Consequently the few goods manufactured for export were
those that had also played some role in import substitution-a variety of
canned and packaged agricultural or fisheries products and, inevitably,
handicrafts. In conditions of free trade the island microstates had few
competitive manufactured products.
Open economies, enabling relatively cheap, untaxed imports, have dis-
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couraged domestic investment (and much foreign investment). Where
industrialization has been successful it has either, as in the case of the Sey-
chelles, been hidden behind tariff barriers, or it has been highly dependent
on the combination of private foreign investment and preferential access
to metropolitan markets. In manufacturing especially, "the foreign sector
is the economy" (Dommen and Hein 1985, 152). As UNCTAD recorded in
1985, "in a small country with no free trade, industrial growth may be
inefficient, however, with free trade a small country may experience no
growth at all and may in fact deindustrialise!" (UNCTAD 1985, 25).
Dependent industrialization or "industrialisation by invitation" (Barry,
Wood, and Preusch 1984, 73) has been highly successful in a number of
states. Spearheaded by low-wage Haiti, and assisted by the tariff exemp-
tions of the 1982 Caribbean Basin Initiative, the growth of manufacturing
is most true of Caribbean microstates, where high technology "screw-
driver" industries in export processing zones are increasingly common.
The factors that have contributed to industrialization there, and in other
island microstates, include low wages and weak unions, substantial tax
concessions, the "freedom to repatriate capital and profits" (as advertised
in postcoup attempts to encourage industrialization in Fiji), and preferen-
tial access to the markets of metropolitan states. Caribbean states, for
example, have preferential access to the United States (under the Carib-
bean Basin Initiative), to Canada, and to the EEC (under the Lome Con-
vention); Pacific Island states have access to Australia and New Zealand,
through the South Pacific Area Regional Trade and Economic Coopera-
tion Agreement (SPARTECA), and also to the EEC. Though Brookfield has
queried: "what greater form of dependence is there than imitation?" (1975,
202), industrialization now generates significant exports and incomes in
several states. Despite new employment opportunities there have, how-
ever, been costs: women, and most workers in the new export processing
zones are women, work in repressive, authoritarian conditions for very
low wages. Many see factory employment as a means of acquiring indus-
trial skills for subsequent emigration. Governments are rarely capable of
reducing the substantial profit transfers of transnational corporations, so
that increased employment is often the principal and only gain. Character-
istic of the "new manufacturing" is the production of goods whose unfa-
miliar raw materials must be imported and that have limited utility in the
island microstates: woollen garments are the major manufactured exports
from Mauritius and Tonga, though few of the women workers have ever
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seen a sheep or worn such a garment. Production is wholly dependent on
external market conditions.
With few exceptions, there would be virtually no significant export
industries without considerable positive discriminatory legislation in their
favor, both in the island states and in metropolitan states. Though all
trading agreements, such as the Lome Convention and SPARTECA, impose
substantial restrictions on the range and volumt: of irn}l0rts (that are now
causing considerable frustration in Mauritius and Fiji), they have been
crucial to industrialization and thus to economic diversification. Privi-
leged access is always under threat in the export destinations, hence "the
need for continuous political negotiation at the international level-an
expensive proposition for a small country" (Hein 1986, IS). Clearly, privi-
leged access depends on the political and economic situation in metropoli-
tan states. One view of the Caribbean Basin Initiative is that "it has
appeared at a time when these struggling countries have been forced to
abandon their conventional inward-looking approaches to development,
by which they had tried unsuccessfully to insulate themselves from world
market pressures. Instead, they have begun to adopt export-promoting
strategies similar to those that have proved so successful in East Asia"
(Conklin 1987, 3). Ironically, yet significantly, this particular article is sub-
titled "A Regional Solution for America's Threatened Enterprise?" In the
Pacific, the Pacific Islands Industrial Development Scheme was a New
Zealand government financed plan to give their companies financial and
other incentives to set up manufacturing and processing ventures in the
region, in a policy described as "abetting not aiding" (Richardson, 1982).
In many respects, even relatively successful industrial development in
island microstates has been primarily dependent on the policies of both
metropolitan governments and manufacturers.
As elsewhere in the world, the service sector has increasingly become
the most dynamic sector in island microstates. Historically characterized
by tourism, the service sector has now expanded to incorporate data-
processing industries (especially in the Caribbean) and tax havens, as the
finance industry has decentralized from heavily taxed metropolitan states.
In a number of countries tourism is the single most important contributor
to the gross domestic product. The few island microstates where tourism
is unimportant-the Atlantic states, the Comoros, and the central Pacific
states-are among the poorest of the least developed countries; interna-
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tional transport constraints, the costs of inaccessibility, and limited facili-
ties have prevented the genesis of the industry. In Tonga, where tourism is
little more developed, explanations go beyond concerns over harmful cul-
tural influences: "Without the involvement of foreign commercial and
political interests, Tonga has not evolved the essential ties with metropoli-
tan markets and their tourism companies. It would seem that Tonga's
tourist industry has paradoxically suffered because -the country was not
exploited as a fully fledged colony" (Britton 1987, 131). This is no para-
dox. Access to metropolitan states is critical because there is minimal
indigenous tourism.
Tourism constitutes perhaps the only economic sector where there are
genuine comparative advantages for island microstates: clean beaches,
unpolluted waters, warm weather, and at least the vestiges of distinctive
cultures, though sometimes these turn out to be illusory. Competition
between countries is considerable, tourism is unusually subject to the
whims of fashion, and wages are often low. Structurally it is in some
respects analogous to industrial export processing zones, though its con-
cessional status is less evident; it is vulnerable to economic uncertainty
(domestic and international), local and regional political instability, and
to ecological changes that often result from tourism itself. The tourist
industry has been advised to abandon its vestigial historic concern over
cultural change. The World Bank, noting that the future expansion of
tourism in Fiji may be limited because of inadequate superior quality
shopping, hotel, and leisure facilities and sightseeing, also emphasized
that Fiji was deficient because "the local culture has not been tailored and
projected so as to attract tourist attention as has been done in Hawaii and
Bali" (World Bank 1987, 14). Nonetheless, the most successful tourist
states (such as Barbados, Bahamas, and Bermuda) enjoy the highest living
standards and lowest unemployment rates of all island microstates. As
Janet Momsen has concluded for the Caribbean:
In the present climate of international relationships tourism holds especially
good prospects for the Caribbean as compared to other industries because it
constitutes trade with the wealthiest countries in the world in a situation in
which protectionism, which in this case would be the restriction of travel by
North Americans and Europeans, is far more difficult to impose than it is to
impose on visible exports from Third World countries. In the light of a reas-
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foreign exchange for Caribbean countries under declining terms of trade, tour-
ism remains a vital element in the economic survival of these developing
nations despite the social problems attached to it. (1986,23)
Though this is undoubtedly true of the more accessible Caribbean, and
has been true for some island microstates elsewhere, it is apparent that it
will be difficult, for sliGh gains to be realized inrhesame manner in the
more remote Indian, South Pacific, and Atlantic ocean states, or for there
to be much localization of the industry.
In the search for diversity, as other sources of earnings have dwindled,
financial service industries have gained in their attractions for island
microstates and have certain advantages for them: "precisely because their
economies lack internal linkages, there is little difficulty in designing a set
of tax advantages which not only do not weaken the domestic tax base but
actually widen it beyond what the local economy itself could achieve"
(Dommen and Hein 1985, 166). For overseas corporations financial service
industries enable international profit shifting through transfer pricing and
the reduction of domestic tax liabilities. Most island tax havens are in the
Caribbean (Cayman Islands, Bahamas), nearby (Bermuda), or near Great
Britain, though Vanuatu has been a significant Pacific success story (Con-
nell and Pritchard 1990). Newcomers, forced to compete with established
players, have sometimes found the going difficult; problems of distance,
competition, and inappropriate infrastructure have restricted the growth
of even this extremely flexible and mobile activity. Its future growth is
wholly dependent on the taxation regimes of metropolitan states; how-
ever, where secrecy provisions are considerable, as in Vanuatu, tax havens
are likely to withstand many changes in metropolitan legislation.
Symptomatic of the limited success of manufacturing, and the growth
of the service industry, is the manner in which the export of postage
stamps has become a significant source of income, though in such small
dependent territories as Pitcairn and Wallis and Futuna, few of these
stamps ever actually reach the islands. In Tuvalu stamps have represented
as much as 65 percent of the value of all exports and the Philatelic Bureau
is a key source of employment. Several archipelagic microstates issue
stamps for several different islands. In these circumstances, the task of
maintaining sales to the metropolitan market without flooding it is a diffi-
cult one, and, as Tuvalu's recent crash suggests, the market for stamps




The manner in which an economic activity so apparently obscure as the
production of postage stamps has become significant to the future of the
smallest island states emphasizes their considerable difficulties in achiev-
ing economic growth through conventional strategies and, conversely, the
degree of success that some countries have had with apparently unconven-
tional strategies-such as tax havens or even tourism-that are of minimal
significance in larger states. However, the fact that several island states are
defined by the United Nations as least developed countries indicates that
disappointments are more widespread than successes. Disappointments
are exacerbated by rising populations; with few exceptions, populations
of island microstates are now as large as they have ever been, and growth
rates, despite emigration and recent declines in fertility, often remain high.
A small number of these countries are only just beginning to experience
the demographic transition.
Along with changes in fertility and mortality, there have also been
changes in the spatial distribution of island populations. It is no longer
possible to regard Islanders as solely rural people. In most cases urbaniza-
tion has been a result of the rapid postwar and postindependence expan-
sion in government activity and spending; the consequent boom in well-
paid, secure, bureaucratic job opportunities, primarily for the educated
elite and skilled workers; and the resultant growth in other areas of service
employment. Uneven development and urban bias are typical of even the
smallest island nations.
Virtually without exception the island microstates have become charac-
terized by emigration and, in this context, as in so many others, the Pacific
states have followed the experience of their Caribbean counterparts. As
the history of migration demonstrates, its structure (duration, volume
and, especially, destination) is affected more by conditions in the receiving
than in the sending countries, and is more likely to be controlled at the
destination than within the islands. Despite such controls, which have cer-
tainly significantly slowed emigration, the number of Islanders overseas is
substantial and, in many circumstances, the balance of population contin-
ues to shift away from the island states; for some-but particularly for ter-
ritories such as the Cook Islands or Montserrat-there are more Islanders
overseas than at "home."
Emigration has two positive advantages that together discourage
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national opposition; it acts as a safety-valve to reduce population pressure
on scarce resources, and it leads to a flow of remittances. In many small
states, remittances are the principal source of national income; only where
tourism is triumphant or where emigration is rare (Melanesia) is this not
true. For Cape Verde "it is no exaggeration to state that this ensures the
survival of the country" (Lesourd and Reaud-Thomas 1987, II7). In West-
ern Samoa,· as elsewhere, migrants have become ."the most ·valuable
export" (Shankman 1976, 28). There, emigration has become so much the
norm that when external constraints prevented or discouraged it, the
"stolen dreams" of young men led to an increase in the suicide rate that
approached epidemic proportions (Macpherson 1990). Opportunities for
migration are highly valued by Islanders, freedom of movement is given
high priority, a "transnational corporation of kin" (Bertram and Watters
1985,499) has emerged, allowing kin groups to colonize and exploit eco-
nomic opportunities across a wide range of environments, and in certain
circumstances fertility may have risen to ensure greater access to migra-
tion opportunities. At the household level in Tuvalu, parents actively
hope to produce remittance earners and most feel that this necessitates
having more than one son. As one woman said of her only son, "One is
not enough. If he goes away to work, there is no one to look after me here.
If he stays and cares for me, no one earns any money overseas." Another
woman recognized that her husband had been right to insist that they
needed more children: "He said that if we had many children we might
have a smart one who could go on to school and get good work. He will
be our road to money and imported goods" (Chambers 1986, 283-284).
Because domestic employment opportunities are diminishing, migration is
viewed as a way to spread and diminish risks. Though it is not without
costs (higher dependency ratios, agricultural decline, cultural change, and
greater individualism), most countries now seek better overseas outlets
rather than seeking to limit emigration. Cape Verde, with opportunities
constrained in the United States, is now attempting to diversify its destina-
tions; in 1987 the president declared, "We think that if we get organised,
we will be able to go on counting on emigration as a major component of
our drive to regulate our economy" (quoted in Connell I988a, 31). Indeed,
where emigration from island microstates is difficult, attitudes to those
once forced to emigrate have changed; in Kiribati "in earlier days they
were called the land-hungry people; they were the unfortunate ones who
did not have sufficient land. Now our values have changed. Settling over-
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seas, beyond the oceans of our islands, is something to be sought after.
Why? Because our population is still growing. So now many consider
them, the resettled ones, as the fortunate ones and they consider us to be
the unfortunate ones" (Schutz and Tenten 1979, 127).
Crucial to the role of emigration for island microstates is its future via-
bility, which necessarily depends on the economic situation and political
decisions in current and potential host nations. Several recent studies in
the Pacific have concluded, often reluctantly, that improved migration
opportunities for the people of island microstates constitute a genuine
form of development assistance. For example, the Australian aid agency
AIDAB has suggested that "for those countries with very poor prospects for
self-sustaining development and poor standards of living, opening up of
migration policy may be an essential adjunct to aid" (AIDAB 1987, 34). Few
Islanders would differ with this conclusion, and emigration will continue
to represent a formidable aspiration within their states.
The final source of income in island microstates is foreign aid. Despite
the rhetoric of self-reliance, there has been little or no opposition to the
principle of sustained and increased aid delivery. Overall per capita aid
flows to island microstates are exceptionally high by global standards;
these countries have long benefited from a widespread "small-country
bias" in aid delivery. States that have remained in some form of dependent
relationship (such as Niue, Pitcairn,the Micronesian states, or the French
overseas departments and territories-the DOM-TOMS) have been even
more fortunate (Aldrich and Connell 1991; Connell 199W). Though the
need of island microstates is obvious, aid is much more visible in the
dependent territories and is far beyond the economic imperative that pov-
erty demands. "Small states carry the same voting weight in the United
Nations as large states, so the strategic and political imperatives of aid
tend to favour small countries" (Jackson Report 1984, 42). The same
review of Australian aid delivery noted that "the faster development takes
place the better Australian strategic and economic interests will be served.
As development programs succeed, the need for aid will decline and ulti-
mately disappear" (Jackson Report 1984, 23). Yet aid has disappeared only
in exceptional circumstances, where metropolitan countries have exacted
punishment for the folly of political decisions taken in island microstates
(such as immediately, but only briefly, after the Fiji coups). More gener-
ally, where large regions such as the Pacific have been perceived to have a
growing strategic significance, traditional donors have increased their aid
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and new donors have entered the field. In exceptional cases these trends
have been resisted, but rarely by governments:
Over half our annual budget is from foreign aid (direct and indirect). Like
most other Pacific countries, we've become a permanent welfare case. I can't
see us ever getting out of the hole. Many of our leaders don't want to: foreign
aid is now built into their view ofdeve1opment,intotheiLway_Qf1ik It is also
in the interests of foreign powers (our supposed benefactors) to keep us
hooked on their aid. (Wendt 1987,15)
Such views have not found official favor with either donors or recipients,
and aid levels are likely to remain high, not because aid will ultimately
contribute to economic growth but because of its political and strategic
significance.
The decline or stagnation of the productive sector (especially agricul-
ture), and the growth of imports, offset by aid, remittances, and tourist
revenues, in a situation where much employment is concentrated in the
public sector has led to the conceptualization of the smallest Pacific
microstates as MIRAB economies, dependent on Migration, Remittances,
and Aid, and thus sustaining the burgeoning Bureaucracy (Bertram and
Watters 1985). The urban bias of MIRAB economies, in aid delivery, bank
loans, and urbanization (especially of the bureaucracy), together with the
demise of agriculture and fisheries, suggests that a better acronym would
be MURAB (Munro 1990). Harold Brookfield has gone beyond this to sug-
gest that, since it is Government Employment that predominates in the
bureaucracy, the microstate economy might best be conceived of as a
MIRAGE, that is, scarcely a genuine or sustainable economy (quoted in
Bertram and Watters 1985, 497). One of the proponents of MIRAB, Geoff
Bertram, has argued that in such small island states the thrust of most
development planning, with its focus on production, is misplaced because
"aid, philately and migrant remittances are not merely supplements to
local incomes, they are the foundations of the modern economy" (Bertram
1986, 809). Moreover, they have virtually no negative ecological implica-
tions. This analysis, first propounded for Kiribati, Tuvalu, and the depen-
dent territories of the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau, is applicable, to a
greater or lesser extent, to most island microstates. For better or worse,
these nations have overturned the classical theories of economic develop-
ment as they move into a "postindustrial" era.
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THE END OF THE ERA OF DECOLONIZATION
In the smallest island microstates, and particularly the remaining depen-
dent territories where aid (and remittances) have been substantial, the
structure of the economy has been transformed from subsistence toward
subsidy. This has been most apparent in the dependent MIRAB territories,
such as Tokelau, the Cook Islands, and the emerging Micronesian states,
but was perhaps first recorded in the Torres Strait Islands (eg, Beckett
1987). In each of these cases the subsistence (and minor export) economy
was rapidly eroded. The smallest colonies and states, by choice, and
larger island microstates, for want of a superior option, have increased
their ties with metropolitan powers and moved from productive status
toward rentier status. It has recently become apparent that exactly the
same structural transformation is occurring among many minority peo-
ples on the strategic periphery of large states, for example in the Arctic. In
every case, communities do not wish to withdraw toward subsistence and
self-reliance, migration of the young has reduced genuine local develop-
ment opportunities, and metropolitan governments have been willing,
reluctantly or not, to construct a new form of bureaucratic dependency.
The epitome of MIRAB economies may well be found in such French
overseas departments as Martinique, where
a growing economic dependence on the Metropole, stemming from a plunge in
the productive capacity of the islands, a shift from the primary to the services
sector (with no intervening expansion of industry), the growth in transfer
funds (particularly family allocations), the ballooning of the local bureaucracy,
and the growing exodus of what is considered the more dynamic, enterprising,
and often skilled part of the island's youth-nevertheless combined with a visi-
ble heightening in the population's standards of living, health, education, ser-
vices and level of infrastructure-could only intensify Martinicans' perceived
political dependence on, and the fierceness of their loyalty to, France. (Miles
1986 ,IS8)
It is no accident that the initial formulation of the MIRAB concept inccrpo-
rated both politically independent island states and dependent territories.
Political independence was not a significant variable. In Martinique and
elsewhere, the central economic problem is to preserve and enhance the
status of rentier economies. Consequently, after conventional develop-
ment strategies have proved disappointing, practices once regarded in a
largely negative light, such as tourism and emigration, have become
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widely enshrined as policies. Industrialization is by imitation and invita-
tion; tax havens are created, and territorial waters leased out, as depen-
dence is increasingly negotiated. Rising expectations, ecological degrada-
tion on land and sea, and population growth reduce historically valid
economic options. For the moment rentier economies have been able to
diversify into new arenas as governments contemplate a variety of
options, and, where territories (especially island territories1 occupy strate-
gic locations, real prospects for maintaining and enhancing rentier status
are very substantial.
Overseas dependent territories are no longer the classic colonies that
once generated a wealth of literature on the evils of unequal exchange,
colonialism, dependency, exploitation, and uneven development. By con-
trast they are the recipients of considerable largesse from the center, most
apparent for the smallest territories where exports are minimal and
dwarfed by imports (though significant income is also generated through
the invisible earnings of tourism or tax havens). Partly in consequence,
demands for greater incorporation into the center have become stronger
than pressures for independence. Indeed, it has been argued that depart-
mentalization represents a form of decolonization without independence.
Albert Ramassamy, the senator for the French Indian Ocean department
of Reunion, has suggested that "for the old colonies that have become
departments integration is a form of decolonisation just as much as inde-
pendence for those who have chosen that" (1987, 8). Yet this version
of "decolonisation" is not without its problems; within the DOMS (and
TOMS) there is an inequitable distribution of resources, unemployment
rates much higher than in France, and ethnic tensions that overlay cul-
tural and economic differences. Elsewhere, this particular definition of
"decolonisation" has largely been formulated in and by the metropolitan
states.
In most overseas territories, political incorporation has led to the con-
struction of a welfare state (with diverse financial advantages) and, except
in the British colonies, has ensured that the ability to migrate to the metro-
politan country is a right that is zealously guarded. In the Cook Islands
and American Samoa, rights to migrate to New Zealand and the United
States respectively have been critical factors discouraging demands for
political independence. For the Micronesian states-the Marshall Islands
and the Federated States of Micronesia-the movement in 1986 from
trusteeship (under the American-administered Trust Territory of the
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Pacific Islands) to a looser relationship with the United States was accom-
panied by a formal Compact of Free Association in which the two states
sought the provision that their citizens "may enter into, lawfully engage in
occupations and establish residence as a non-immigrant in the United
States and its territories and possessions," to ensure that a "safety-valve"
was put in place. Since then there has been considerable migration to
Guam and the Northern Marianas, and the Start of on-ward migration to
the United States (Hezel and Levin 1990).
With the principal exception of New Caledonia, independence move-
ments in small island territories are absent, and, in a number of the DOM-
TOMS, even the tiny independence movements have noted that though
independence would provide the psychological boost of political auton-
omy, it could lead to some decline in the physical quality of life. In French
Polynesia, John Teariki commented on the prospects for independence: "It
would be difficult now as the people are not ready for independence. The
Tahitians live an unnatural life now. They live off imported goods, tinned
food and other things. There would be struggles, unemployment, all pos-
sible things." In Guadeloupe the principal pro-independence party has
stated, "one must choose freedom and its difficulties" or even "dignity and
deprivation" (quoted in Aldrich and Connell 1991). This is analogous to
the situation in Puerto Rico where the small independence movement
stresses the theme of "false consciencisation" (Blaut 1987). Not surpris-
ingly, ideological austerity has usually been combined with minimal sup-
port. More generally, as in Bermuda and, to a lesser extent, the Turks and
Caicos Islands, there is a generalized concern that factional politics in a
small-island state would be disruptive and that dependent political status
is preferable because it appears to guarantee the continued success of busi-
ness activity (especially tourism and tax havens), political stability, and
security (Connell 1987a, 1990).
Underlying all debates on changing political and economic status, and
hence relationships with the metropolitan country (and with other
regional and metropolitan states), are two conflicting issues, well summa-
rized in the case of Guam:
There is in Guam's quest for political identity a fundamental contradiction in
what Guam is trying to accomplish. The Chamorro activists belatedly seized
upon self-determination as the major principle behind commonwealth. But
self-determination marches under the flag of freedom, whereas commonwealth
marches under the banner of equality. Although they may seem to go arm in
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arm, Alexis de Tocqueville noted long ago that freedom and equality will
always be at odds with each other. (Rogers 1988, 25-26)
Political integration, as in the French departments, provides no hope of
more self-reliant economic development, or the recognition of local cul-
tural issues and rights. Movement toward more self-reliant economic and
political development reduces external financial support and causes local
concern over both the quality of life and security. In small, often remote
territories where prospects for economic development, based on local
resource exploitation, are inherently poor, and income generation is
dependent on overseas links (tourism, tax havens, trade concessions, etc)
-or direct budgetary support-but where there is significant ethnic and
cultural diversity, tensions over future economic and political status are
certain to persist. In the tiniest and most remote territories-Pitcairn,
Wallis and Futuna or Tristan da Cunha-challenges to metropolitan dom-
inance are implausible, but in situations of substantial ethnic inequality,
where prospects of some degree of greater self-reliant development are not
impossible-as in New Caledonia-contradictions and conflicts in aspira-
tions are more probable. In New Caledonia, where ethnic nationalism and
the quest for identity emphasize decolonization, symbolized in the simul-
taneous stress on "nationalism," "socialism," and "Kanak" in the indepen-
dence coalition's title, the late leader of the pro-independence FLNKS, Jean-
Marie Tjibaou once claimed: "As long as one Kanak survives a problem
for France remains" (quoted in Connell 1987b, 445).
Independent island states have not surprisingly rarely sought any
diminution of political autonomy. However, in Dominica, situated be-
tween the French departments of Martinique and Guadeloupe, and in
Guyana, so close to the French department of Guyane (French Guiana),
there has been intermittent (and almost certainly minority) interest in
becoming a French overseas department (eg, McDonald 1989), while in
the much larger state of Jamaica, Prime Minister Michael Manley recently
observed: "In the Caribbean we are accelerating the integration process
because we will not survive as a set of disparate mini-states, unless we
want to become a department of France" (quoted in Gauhar 1989, II).
More generally in island microstates, political autonomy has rarely met
the economic aspirations of Islanders. There has been significant (often
illegal) migration into Caribbean departments, notably from Haiti to
Guadeloupe, from Dominica and St Lucia to Martinique, and from Brazil
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and Surinam to French Guiana. In the Indian Ocean there has been a mas-
sive recent migration from the Comoros to Mayotte. Other Caribbean
island territories, notably Puerto Rico and the American and British Vir-
gin Islands, have also experienced significant immigration from nearby
independent states. In the Pacific, approximately half the population of
American Samoa have migrated from Western Samoa, and many have
gone from Tonga to Niue. In some cases this-represents the first stage of
migration to the metropolis.
Though most island states, especially in the Pacific, have development
plans, and even policies, that emphasize the need to achieve greater self-
reliance, such statements are rhetoric rather than reality, a legacy of the
postindependence optimism of the 1970s. Like the situation in the DOM-
TOMS, for such small island states as Kiribati, greater self-reliance is only
possible "at a price. It will not be achieved without further sacrifice in
terms of foregone consumption and restricted aspirations.... Many
more sacrifices will be required in the future if a true commitment to self-
reliance is to be maintained" (Pollard 1987, 23). Such sacrifices in tandem
with ideological purity are rare. Despite the rhetoric of independence and
self-reliance, island states in the postindependence era have invariably
been more closely integrated into the economies of metropolitan states.
"Indeed there are diplomatic advantages to be gained by Island govern-
ments persisting with the rhetoric of autonomous 'development' and
insisting on their rights, as self-governing entities, to determine their own
goals. They may thus for some time find it advantageous to refuse to
recognise the MIRAB model and its implications" (Bertram and Watters
1985,516). This has proved to be the case; no concept has been more deni-
grated by Pacific Island politicians and planners. '
Because regional cooperation and trade have largely been failures,
through complementarity and competition, more distant ties have in-
creased in importance. Microstates and colonies that have a "special rela-
tionship" with a metropolitan power are better off than those that do not.
Ed Dommen has bluntly stated that "the particularly poor island countries
are those which have failed to establish sufficiently intimate relations with
a prosperous protector" (Dommen 1980, 195). In the same vein, Simon
Winchester has suggested that the remaining British colonies might be bet-
ter off to strengthen their ties with the United Kingdom in the manner that
French "colonies" have become overseas territories and departments (Win-
chester 1985, 309). Early in 1987, when it was feared in the Turks and
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Caicos Islands that the United Kingdom might relinquish its sovereignty,
there were moves there to make the colony a ward or territory of Canada
(Connell 1991b). In the Pacific, as one prominent member of Parliament in
the Australian Labor government, Gordon Bilney, recently pointed out,
despite it being "an unfortunate fact for those who believe in indepen-
dence and freedom of determination" because standards of living, includ-
ing health levels, were higher in associated territories, "Perhaps the best
thing that countries like Australia should be doing in the South Pacific is
encouraging moves towards closer satrapy-towards closer association
and, indeed, even eventual incorporation of these polities into the major
powers such as Australia" (quoted in Connell 1988a, 83). At about the
same time it was noted that "the question of closer political integration
with metropolitan countries has received little serious attention to date,
but it is a possibility that Pacific leaders may wish to address" (Fairbairn
1987, 51). Because of the structure of development, the smallest states are
inexorably moving toward a situation where their autonomy is severely
constrained, yet none is likely to relinquish independent political status.
The states that are the greatest recipients of aid on a global per capita
basis are primarily colonies and territories. As the case of Martinique
demonstrates, this has discouraged independence aspirations. Moreover,
as Tuvalu and Mayotte have shown in quite different ways, secession
from an independent island state substantially increases material rewards.
Tony Thorndike has even argued that the smaller Caribbean states, such
as Grenada, "particularly sought independence ultimately to gain access
to multilateral aid funds and to participate in international forums pri-
marily concerned with economic development, rather than from an appre-
ciation of its intrinsic worth" (Thorndike 1985; my emphasis). The combi-
nation of a degree of isolation (and hence strategic significance) and a
measure of political "independence," through either sovereign status or
recognition in some manner as a separate political entity, has granted
superior access not only to aid but to new areas of policy formulation and
concessions of other kinds. In these respects colonies have definite advan-
tages. The reality of closer incorporation underlies most development
practice, and widespread high levels of migration are the reality and meta-
phor of development. Small is no longer beautiful; remote islands are
too often "beautiful but no place to live" (Bedford 1980, 65). As long as
small island states freely choose strategies that permit the manipulation of
metropolitan national policies, the structure of development of island
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states and dependent territories will continue to converge. Meanwhile the
global era of decolonization draws to a close. The ties that bind are likely
to endure, though the conflict between freedom and equality is sure to
persist.
THE SECOND MIRAGE
Over time, remote islands have been more effectively incorporated into
the periphery in a number of ways-including those of trade, aid, migra-
tion, and political subordination. Marriage, education, and new forms of
media have all stressed metropolitan ties, though rarely to the extent of
Guam, where the influence of television has been so pervasive that "not
only does it make us feel homesick for places we have never been, it gives
us the uneasy feeling that what we experience daily is abnormal" (Under-
wood 1985, 171). Commodities have tied distant islands to another world;
in most island states the contents of the stores are imported; in rural Fiji,
of 82 products sold at one small island cooperative in mid-I986 a third
were food products, and well over half originated entirely outside Fiji, "an
astonishing testimony to the history of colonialism and the more recent
organisation of international commerce," the result of becoming "insatia-
ble consumers, conditioned to need an ever-increasing array of disposable
goods" (Price 1985, 217; McInnes and Connell 1988). The store, an incur-
sion from another world, has incorporated remote islands into that other
world even more effectively than production or migration. Incorporation
has emphasized relative deprivation, and the manner in which island
states can never have the range of social and economic opportunities
found in metropolitan states.
Exotic images of tropical islands and widespread assumptions of some-
thing akin to a history of "subsistence affluence" (Fisk 1982), even en-
abling some to discover situations "where the poor are happy" (Owen
1955), contrasts with a reality of struggle for survival, and the erosion of
sovereignty, as self-reliance becomes no more than a chimera. Even in
much larger countries, attempts to achieve self-reliance often appear no
more than reflections of the aspirations that must suffice if growth cannot
easily be achieved. As R. A. Joseph has put it in a Nigerian context, self-
reliance is "little more than a ritual for exorcising the devil of dependence"
(Joseph 1978, 223). This is not very different from Colin Leys' observation
for Kenya that foreign capital must "be ritually 'humiliated' while practi-
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cally wooed" (1985, 208). Because of the difficulty of becoming self-reliant
in such basic requirements as food and energy, even if appropriate policies
were chosen, put most bluntly, "it would only be by accepting primitive
standards of development for all the people that autarky could be made in
any way practicable.... Even in the Pacific, perhaps the one remaining
part of the world in which such ideas do not appear absurd, the pace of
absorption into tne worldecohomic and political system is quickening all
the time" (Payne 1987, 56). But islands and societies were never wholly iso-
lated and self-reliant in the past. Where this tended to occur, islands like
Anuta, despite complex precautions, were rare examples of the "Malthu-
sian crisis" and historic populations on islands such as Pitcairn perished.
Consequently, as in the Caroline Islands of Micronesia, atoll dwellers
organized themselves into clusters and complexes for distant reciprocal
cooperation. Such activity could not always ward off devastation. There
is no reason to believe that island states today can achieve greater self-reli-
ance. The future lies in maximizing the various elements of interdepen-
dence, taking advantage of concessionary schemes and the strategic signif-
icance of almost all island microstates, while strengthening self-reliance in
such critical areas as food production and artisanal fisheries in order to
maintain the "subsistence safety net."
The existence of secession movements in almost all island microstates
at one time or another (now in militant form on the island of Bougainville
in Papua New Guinea) would appear to be anomalous, in the sense that
very small islands are seeking to cut some critical political and economic
ties. Yet there is no anomaly. Anguilla, Mayotte, and Tuvalu have each
demonstrated how secession in search of identity has brought greater
material (and probably cultural) rewards, through direct relations with
the outside world, either as a colony or as an independent state, than as a
remote outlier of a nearby independent state. Elsewhere, as in Rodrigues,
where the elite complain over their "neocolonial" status as an outer island
of Mauritius, and seek some form of direct association with Europe or
another wealthy continent (Paul 1987, 10) the same sentiments are
expressed. Where isolation is combined with distinctive ethnicity, such
sentiments are strengthened into variants of "ethnic nationalism," whose
resurgence has become a global phenomenon.
Following what some have perceived as the demise of communism, or
at the very least the recent death of Stalinism in Eastern Europe, Francis
Fukuyama wrote in his essay "The End of History" (I989a), that history
.~. m
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had ended in the sense that there was no longer a "history of ideology";
capitalism had triumphed over communism and Marx's one-hundred-
fifty-year-old experiment was simply an irrelevant detour. The successors
of the liberal and democratic states of the French and American revolu-
tions were wholly dominant in ideological terms. Critics of Fukuyama's
views suggested that he had been premature in dismissing communism,
that Islamic fundamentalism nad prevailed over liberalism in manicoun-
tries, and that nationalism is currently in sometimes direct conflict with
liberalism. It was this last criticism that Fukuyama took most seriously-
based on the emergent nationalisms of postglasnost Europe and their
potential to degenerate into authoritarianism and fascism (1989b)-and it
is this challenge, currently in nonauthoritarian form (except perhaps in
Bougainville), that threatens the integrity of many island states. Most
island microstates are new, many are artificial, and few are able to distrib-
ute evenly or equitably the scanty rewards of development over an often-
fragmented geographical space. Postindependence national governments
have sought to establish a national identity in countries where there was
no struggle for independence and where secessionist aspirations are not
unusual; the construction of nations from within is fraught with difficulty.
Further political fission and fragmentation seem inevitable.
Quite recently a review of development problems in island states con-
cluded by posing the question: "Is it too much to suggest that small
islands, for all the problems and constraints that confront them, could
become the laboratory in which alternative development strategies,
shaped by the notion of self-reliance, first see the light of day?" (Dolman
1985, 63). Unfortunately for populist notions, such a romantic vision has
arrived much too late. Indeed, it points directly to a second mirage-that
there really is something that can be identified as development. There is
not. Development is a wholly relative concept. Although Sandra Wall-
man's early conceptualization of development emphasized both basic
needs and autonomy, she stressed that they were not complementary pro-
cesses. In island microstates thoroughly incorporated into global economy
and society, even improvements in basic needs are set against their supe-
rior satisfaction elsewhere; development may have occurred, but it has not
been achieved. At the same time, autonomy has certainly declined. In the
three senses that Johan Galtung has defined power-"ideological power is
the power of ideas. Renunerative power is the power of having goods to
offer, a 'quid' in return for a 'quo'. Punitive power is the power of having
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'bads' to offer, destruction; also called force, violence" (1973, 33)-the
island microstates have experienced a decline. In Dudley Seers' terms, they
have not gained in independence, despite the "culture of resistance" that
has, in some contexts, enabled the retention of an "independence of spirit"
(Petersen 1984, 359).
As one ideological world becomes dominant, and even nationalism is
constructed-in Euto-peanterms, then the retreat to self-relianee will
become less and less palatable. Planners brought their prescriptions for
development to the island microstates as they had previously done in other
parts of the world. As far back as 1977 van Arkadie wrote of these "gifts of
the latest advice" that "we might well see these fluctuations as more geared
to meeting the needs of the now considerable development studies profes-
sion than responding to real problems-a sort of planned obsolescence in
ideas" (1978, 409). Such heretical views were expressed in a different form
by Fisk: "We have all seen the rise and fall of fashions in cures for underde-
velopment. At one time it was the transfer of technology; at another the
provision of capital; at another it was the development of cooperative
societies; then it was economic planning; then there was a fashion for
community development; more recently there has been a fashion for what
is called integrated development" (1978, 371). Such fashionable changes
have continued. Underlying these sometimes conflicting prescriptions
were the visions of Europeans-who sought to impose variants of tradi-
tion and authenticity on latter-day "noble savages." Yet as such notions
challenged island conceptions of the good life, and the "passing parade of
paradigms" (Baker 1979, 167) turned to irrelevance, island microstates
have sought to construct a world of choices, a negotiated multivariate
dependence.
By freely choosing development strategies that allow the manipulation
of metropolitan national policies, island microstates will continue to "live
with some degree of uncertainty, but with insurance provided by the reali-
ties of geopolitics" (Bertram 1986, 821). Diversity is the key to develop-
ment, but a diversity that is global and no longer local. For all those who
have seen in small islands "laboratories of development," many more have
predicted the demise of island populations. For example, Gerard Ward
concluded a keynote paper on the Pacific:
Perhaps a hundred years hence ... almost all the descendants of today's Poly-
nesian or Micronesian Islanders will live in Auckland, Sydney, San Francisco
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and Salt Lake City. Occasionally they may recall that their ancestors once lived
on tiny Pacific Islands. Even more occasionally they may visit the resorts
which, catering for scuba divers, academic researchers or gamblers may pro-
vide the only permanent human activities on lonely Pacific Islands, set in an
empty ocean. (Ward 1989, 245)
It is a scarcely alluring vision, but even a precipitate greenhouse effectwill
leave it no more than that. The astonishing manner in which Pitcairn
Islanders have clung to their tiny isolated outpost of empire (Connell
1988b) is symbol and substance of the new island states in which identity,
combined with isolation and strategic location, have shaped a new world
where multifaceted dependence might be transformed into aid with dig-
nity. But nowhere can it be transformed into development.
::.
I WOULD LIKE to thank an anonymous reviewer for useful comments on a previous
draft.
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